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Abstract
This paper studies the contribution of demand, costs, and strategic factors to the
adoption of hub-and-spoke networks in the US airline industry. Our results are based on
the estimation of a dynamic oligopoly game of network competition that incorporates
three groups of factors which may explain the adoption of hub-and-spoke networks:
(1) travelers value the services associated with the scale of operation of an airline in
the hub airport (e.g., more convenient check-in and landing facilities); (2) operating
costs and entry costs in a route may decline with an airline’s scale operation in origin
and destination airports (e.g., economies of scale and scope); and (3) a hub-and-spoke
network may be an eﬀective strategy to deter the entry of other carriers. We estimate
the model using data from the Airline Origin and Destination Survey with information
on quantities, prices, and entry and exit decisions for every airline company in the
routes between the 55 largest US cities. As a methodological contribution, we propose
and apply a simple method to deal with the problem of multiple equilibria when using
the estimated model to predict the eﬀects of changes in structural parameters. We ﬁnd
that the most important factor to explain the adoption of hub-and-spoke networks is
that the cost of entry in a route declines very importantly with the scale of operation of
the airline in the airports of the route. For some of the larger carriers, strategic entry
deterrence is the second most important factor to explain hub-and-spoke networks.
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The market structure of the US airline industry has undergone important transformations
since the 1978 deregulation that removed restrictions on the routes that airlines could operate
a n do nt h ef a r e st h e yc h a r g e d . 1 Soon after deregulation, most airline companies adopted a
hub-and-spoke system for the structure of their routes. In a hub-and-spoke network an airline
concentrates most of its operations in one airport, called the "hub". All other cities in the
network (the "spokes") are connected to the hub by non-stop ﬂights. Those customers who
travel between two spoke-cities should take a connecting ﬂight at the hub. The arguments
that have been proposed to explain the adoption of hub-and-spoke networks can be classiﬁed
in three groups: demand factors, cost factors and strategic factors. Soon after deregulation,
most airline companies adopted a hub-and-spoke system for the structure of their routes. In
a hub-and-spoke network an airline concentrates most of its operations in one airport, called
the "hub". All other cities in the network (the "spokes") are connected to the hub by non-stop
ﬂights. Those customers who travel between two spoke-cities should take a connecting ﬂight
at the hub. The arguments that have been proposed to explain the adoption of hub-and-
spoke networks can be classiﬁed in three groups: demand factors, cost factors and strategic
factors. Demand-side explanations argue that travelers value diﬀerent services associated
with the scale of operation of an airline in the hub airport, e.g., more convenient check-in
and landing facilities, higher ﬂight frequency.2 Cost-side explanations claim that some costs
depend on the airline’s scale of operation in an airport. For instance, it is well-known that
larger planes are cheaper to ﬂy on a per-seat basis: airlines can exploit these economies of
scale by seating in a single plane, ﬂying to the hub city, passengers who have diﬀerent ﬁnal
destinations. These economies of scale may be suﬃciently large to compensate for larger
distance travelled with the hub-and-spoke system. 3 An airline’s ﬁxed operating cost, and
1Borenstein (1992) and Morrison and Winston (1995) provide excellent overviews of the US airline indus-
try. For recent analyses of the eﬀect of the deregulation, see Alam and Sickles (2000), Morrison and Winston
(2000), Kahn (2001), and Färe, Grosskopf, and Sickles (2007) .
2This demand factor is partly oﬀset by the fact that consumers prefer non-stop ﬂights to stop-ﬂights.
3See Hendricks, Piccione and Tan (1995) for a monopoly model that formalizes this argument.
1its cost of entry in a route, may also decline with the airline’s scale operation in the airports
of the route. These cost savings may be due to technological reasons, but they may be
also linked to contractual arrangements between airports and airlines. A third hypothesis
that has been suggested to explain hub-and-spoke networks is that it can be an eﬀective
strategy to deter the entry of competitors. Hendricks, Piccione and Tan (1997) formalize
this argument in a three-stage game of entry similar to the model in Judd (1985). The
key argument is that, for a hub-and-spoke airline, there is complementarity between proﬁts
at diﬀerent routes. Exit from a route between a hub-city and a spoke-city implies to stop
operating any other route that involves that spoke-city. Therefore, hub-and-spoke airlines
are willing to operate some routes even when proﬁts in that single route are negative. This
is known by potential entrants, and therefore entry may be deterred.4
This paper develops an estimable dynamic structural model of airlines network competi-
tion that incorporates the demand, cost and strategic factors described above. We estimate
this model and use it to measure the contribution of each of these factors to explain hub-and-
spoke networks. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study that estimates a dynamic game
of network competition. In our model, airline companies decide, every quarter, in which
markets (city-pairs) to operate, and the fares for each route-product, they serve. The model
is estimated using data from the Airline Origin and Destination Survey with information
on quantities, prices, and entry and exit decisions for every airline company in the routes
between the 55 largest US cities (1,485 city-pairs).
This paper builds on an extends a signiﬁcant literature in empirical IO on structural
models of competition in the airline industry. The previous studies that are more closely
4Consider a hub airline who is a monopolist in the market-route between its hub-city and a spoke-city. A
non-hub carrier is considering to enter in this route. Suppose that this market-route is such that a monopolist
gets positive proﬁts but under duopoly both ﬁrms suﬀer losses. For the hub carrier, conceding this market to
the new entrant implies that it will also stop operating in other connecting markets and, as a consequence of
that, its proﬁts will fall. The hub operator’s optimal response to the opponent’s entry is to stay in the spoke
market. Therefore, the equilibrium strategy of the potential entrant is not to enter. Hendricks, Piccione
and Tan (1999) extend this model to endogenize the choice of hub versus non-hub carrier. See also Oum,
Zhang, and Zhang (1995) for a similar type of argument that can explain the choice of a hub-spoke network
for strategic reasons.
2related to this paper are Berry (1990 and 1992), Berry, Carnall, and Spiller (2006) and
Ciliberto and Tamer (2006). Berry (1990) and Berry, Carnall, and Spiller (2006) estimate
structural models of demand and price competition with a diﬀerentiated product and obtain
estimates of the eﬀects of hubs on marginal costs and consumers’ demand. Berry (1992)
and Ciliberto and Tamer (2006) estimate static models of entry that provide measures of
the eﬀects of hubs on ﬁxed operating costs. Our paper extends this previous literature in
two important aspects. First, our model is dynamic. A dynamic model is necessary to
distinguish between ﬁxed costs and sunk entry costs, which have diﬀerent implications on
market structure. A dynamic game is also needed to study the hypothesis that a hub-and-
spoke network is an eﬀective strategy to deter the entry of non-hub competitors. Second,
our model endogenizes airline networks in the sense that airlines take into account how
operating or not in a city-pair has implications on its proﬁts (current and future) at other
related routes.
The paper presents also a methodological contribution to the recent literature on the
econometrics of dynamic discrete games.5 We propose and implement an approach to deal
with multiple equilibria when making counterfactual experiments with the estimated model.
Under the assumption that the equilibrium selection mechanism (which is unknown to the
researcher) is a smooth function of the structural parameters, we show how to obtain an
approximation to the counterfactual equilibrium. This method is agnostic on the form
of the equilibrium selection mechanism, and therefore it is more robust than approaches
which require stronger assumptions on equilibrium selection. An intuitive interpretation of
our method is that we select the counterfactual equilibrium which is "closer" (in a Taylor-
approximation sense) to the equilibrium estimated in the data. The data are used not only
to identify the equilibrium in the population but also to identify the equilibrium in the
counterfactual experiments.
We ﬁnd that the scale of operation of an airline in an airport (i.e., its hub-size) has
5See Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007), and Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry
(2007) for recent contributions to this literature.
3statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects on travelers’ willingness to pay (positive eﬀect) and on variable,
ﬁxed and entry costs (negative eﬀect). Nevertheless, the most substantial impact is on the
cost of entry. Descriptive evidence shows that the diﬀerence between the probability that
incumbent stays in a route and the probability that a non-incumbent decides to enter in
that route declines importantly with the airline’s hub-size. In the structural model, this
descriptive evidence translates into a sizeable negative eﬀect of hub-size on sunk entry costs.
Given the estimated model, we implement counterfactual experiments to measure airlines’
propensities to use hub-and-spoke networks when we eliminate each of the demand, cost
and strategic factors in our model. These experiments show that the hub-size eﬀect on
entry costs is the most important factor to explain hub-and-spoke networks. For some of
the larger carriers, strategic entry deterrence is the second most important factor to explain
hub-and-spoke networks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 presents our model and assump-
tions. The data set and the construction of our working sample are described in section 3.
Section 4 discusses the estimation procedure and presents the estimation results. Section 5
describes our procedure to implement counterfactual experiments and our results from these
experiments. We summarize and conclude in section 6.
2M o d e l
2.1 Framework
The industry is conﬁgured by N airline companies, A airports and C cities or metropolitan
areas. Some cities have more than one airport. Airlines and airports are exogenously given in
our model.6 Following Berry (1992), we deﬁne a market in this industry as a city-pair.T h e r e
are M ≡ C(C−1)/2 markets or city-pairs. We index time by t, markets by m, and airlines by
i.A nairline network at period t is the set of city-pairs for which the airline operates non-stop
ﬂights. Note that our market deﬁnition is not directional.L e txit ≡ {ximt : m =1 ,2,...,M}
6However, the estimated model can be used to study the eﬀects of introducing new hypothetical airports
or airlines.
4be the network of airline i at period t,w h e r eximt ∈ {0,1} is a binary indicator for the event
"airline i operates non-stop ﬂights in city-pair m". Therefore, xit belongs to the set X ≡
{0,1}M. This network also describes implicitly the city-pairs for which an airline provides
stop-ﬂights. For instance, consider an industry with 4 cities, say A, B, C,a n dD.T h e
industry has 6 markets or city-pairs that we represent as AB, AC, AD, BC, BD,a n dCD.
Then, if airline i’s network is xit ≡ {xiABt,x iACt,x iADt,xiBCt,x iBDt,x iCDt} = {1,1,0,0,0},
then this airline operates non-stop ﬂights in markets AB and AC,a n ds t o p - ﬂights in market
BC. The whole industry network is represented by the vector xt ≡ {xit : i =1 ,2,...,N} ∈
{0,1}NM.
Taken as given the network at period t, xt, and some exogenous state variables zt ∈ Z,
airlines compete in prices. Price competition determines current proﬁts for each airline and
market. Section 2.1 describes consumers demand, Nash-Bertrand price competition, and
variable proﬁts. Let Ri(xt,zt) b et h ei n d i r e c tv a r i a b l ep r o ﬁt function for airline i that
results from the Nash-Bertrand equilibrium. Every period (quarter), each airline decides its
network for next period. There is time-to-build, such that ﬁxed costs and the entry costs are
paid at quarter t b u te n t r y - e x i td e c i s i o n sa r en o te ﬀective until quarter t +1 . We represent
this decision as ait ≡ {aimt : m =1 ,2,...,M},w h e r eaimt is a binary indicator for the
decision "airline i will operate non-stop ﬂights in city-pair m at period t +1 ". It is clear
that xi,t+1 = ait, but it is convenient to use diﬀerent letters to distinguish state and decision
variables. The airline’s total proﬁtf u n c t i o ni s :
Πi (ait,xt,zt,εit)=Ri(xt,zt) − Fi(ait,xt,εit) (1)
where Fi(.) represents the sum of ﬁxed costs, entry costs and exit costs for airline i over
all city-pairs. The term εit represents a vector of idiosyncratic shocks for airline i which
are private information of this airline and are independently and identically distributed over
airlines and over time with CDF Gε. Section 2.2 describes our speciﬁcation assumptions for
ﬁxed costs and entry costs.7
7There are two main reasons why we incorporate these private information shocks. As shown by Do-
5Airlines maximize intertemporal proﬁts, are forward-looking, and take into account the
implications of their entry-exit decisions on future proﬁts and on the expected future reac-
tion of competitors. Markets are interconnected through hub-size eﬀects, such as entry-exit
decisions in a market/city-pair have implications on airlines’ proﬁts at other city-pairs. In
our model, airlines take into account these network eﬀects when making their entry-exit deci-
sions. We assume that airlines’ strategies depend only on payoﬀ-relevant state variables, i.e.,
Markov perfect equilibrium assumption. An airline’s payoﬀ-relevant information at quarter t
is {xt,zt,εit}.L e tσ ≡ {σi(xt,zt,εit):i =1 ,2,...,N} be a set of strategy functions, one for
each airline. A Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) in this game is a set of strategy functions
such that each airline’s strategy maximizes the value of the airline for each possible state
(xt,zt,εit) and taking as given other airlines’ strategies.
Let V σ
i (xt,zt,εit) represent the value function for airline i given that the other companies
behave according to their respective strategies in σ, and given that airline i uses his best
response/strategy. By the principle of optimality, this value function is implicitly deﬁned as
the unique solution to the following Bellman equation:
V
σ




i (xt+1,zt+1,εit+1) | xt,zt,ait] } (2)
where β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor. The set of strategies σ is a MPE if for every airline





i (xt+1,zt+1,εit+1) | xt,zt,ait] } (3)
That is, every airline strategy is the best response to the other airlines’ strategies.
Given a set of strategy functions σ we can deﬁne a set of Conditional Choice Probabilities
(CCP) P = {Pi(ai|x,z):( ai,x,z) ∈ X2 × Z} such that Pi(ai|x,z) is the probability that
raszelski and Satterthwaite (2007), without private information shocks, this type of dynamic game may not
have an equilibrium. However, Doraszelski and Satterthwaite show that, under mild regularity conditions,
the incorporation of private information shocks implies that the game has at least one equilibrium. Further-
more, private information state variables independently distributed across players are convenient econometric
errors in the sense that they can explain part of the heterogeneity in players’ actions without generating
endogeneity problems.
6ﬁrm i chooses a network ai given that the industry network at the beginning of the period is
x and the value of the exogenous state variables is z.B yd e ﬁnition, these CCPs are obtained
integrating decision rules over the distribution of private information shocks. That is,
Pi(ai|x,z) ≡
Z
I {σi(xt,zt,εit)=ai} dGε(εit) (4)
where I{.} is the indicator function. These probabilities represent the expected behavior
of airline i from the point of view of the rest of the airlines. It is possible to show that
the value functions V σ
i depend on players’ strategy functions only through players’ choice
probabilities.8 T oe m p h a s i z et h i sp o i n tw ew i l lu s et h en o t a t i o nV P
i instead V σ
i to represent
these value functions. Then, we can use the deﬁnition of MPE in expression (14) to represent
a MPE in terms of CCPs. A set of CCPs P is a MPE if for every airline i,e v e r ys t a t e(x,z),















If the density function of εit is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure,
this dynamic game has at least one equilibrium.9 Multiplicity of equilibria in this class of
dynamic games is very common. An equilibrium in this dynamic game provides a description
of the dynamics of prices, quantities, and airlines’ incumbent status for every route between
the C cities of the industry.
The rest of this section describes the details of the model. Section 2.2 presents the
demand system and the static model of price competition. Section 2.3 discusses the structure
of ﬁxed costs and entry costs. Section 2.4 deals with simplifying assumptions that reduce
very signiﬁcantly the dimensionality of the model.
8For more details, see sections 2.3 and 2.4 in Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007).
9See Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2007), and Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) for proofs of equilibrium
existence.
72.2 Consumer demand and variable proﬁts
In the dynamic game of network competition, we have deﬁned a market as a non-directional
city-pair. However, for the model of demand and price competition it is more realistic and
convenient to consider a route as the appropriate market deﬁnition. We deﬁne a route as a
directional round-trip between two cities, e.g., a round-trip from Chicago to Los Angeles. Of
course, this means that to obtain the current proﬁt of operating non-stop ﬂights in a city-pair
m (i.e., ximt =1 ) we have to consider demand and proﬁts in all the routes including this
city-pair. For notational simplicity, we omit the time subindex t for most of this subsection,
but all the variables may vary over time. We index routes by r.
A product can be described in terms of three attributes: the route (r), the airline (i),
and the indicator of non-stop ﬂight (NS).10 For simplicity, we use k instead of the triple
(r,i,NS) to index products. Let Hr be the number of potential travelers in route r.E v e r y
quarter, travelers decide which product to purchase, if any. The indirect utility of a consumer
who purchases product k is Uk = bk − pk + vk,w h e r e :pk is the price; bk is the "quality"
or willingness to pay of the average consumer in the market; and vk is a consumer-speciﬁc
component that captures consumer heterogeneity in preferences. We use the index k =0to
represent a traveler decision of not travelling by air (i.e. the outside alternative). Quality
and price of the outside alternative are normalized to zero.11
Product quality bk depends on exogenous characteristics of the airline and the route, and
on the scale of operation of the airline in the origin and destination airports. We consider
the following speciﬁcation of product quality:
bk = α1 NSk + α2 HUBO
k + α3 HUBD
k + α4 (1 − NSk)HUBC











α1 to α5 are parameters. NSk is a dummy variable for "non-stop ﬂight". DISTk is the
distance between the origin and destination cities. This variable is a proxy of the value of
10We do not model explicitly other forms of product diﬀerentiation, such as ﬂights frequency or service
quality. Consumers’ valuation of these other forms of product diﬀerentiation will be embedded in the airline
ﬁxed-eﬀects and the airport ﬁxed-eﬀects that we include in the demand estimation.
11Therefore, bk should be interpreted as willingness to pay relative to the value of the outside alternative.
8air transportation relative to the outside alternative, i.e., air travelling is a more attractive
transportation mode when distance is larger. ξ
(1)
i is an airline ﬁxed-eﬀe c tt h a tc a p t u r e s





r ) represents the interaction of origin-airport dummies (destination airport dummies)
and time dummies. These terms account for demand shocks, such as seasonal eﬀects, which
can vary across cities and over time. ξ
(4)




k are indexes that represent the scale of operation
or "hub size" of airline i in the origin, destination and connecting (if any) airports of route r,
respectively. Therefore, the terms associated with these variables capture consumer willing-
ness to pay for the services associated with the scale of operation of an airline in the origin,
destination and connecting airports. Following previous studies, we measure the hub-size of
an airline in an airport as the sum of the population in the cities that the airline serves from
this airport (see Section 3 for more details).
A consumer purchases product k if and only if the utility Uk is greater than the utilities of
any other choice alternative available for route r. This condition describes the unit demands
of an individual consumer. To obtain aggregate demand, qk, we have to integrate individual
demands over the idiosyncratic variables vk. The form of the aggregate demands depends
on our assumption on the probability distribution of consumer heterogeneity. We consider
a nested logit model with two nests. The ﬁrst nest represents the decision of which airline
(or outside alternative) to patronize. The second nest consists of the choice of stop versus
non-stop ﬂi g h t . W eh a v et h a tvk = σ1 v
(1)
ir + σ2 v
(2)





Type I extreme value random variables, and σ1 and σ2 are parameters which measure the
dispersion of these variables, with σ1 ≥ σ2.L e tsk be the market share of product k in route
r, i.e., sk ≡ qk/Hr.A n d l e t s∗
k be the market share of product k within the products of
airline i in route r, i.e., s∗
k ≡ sk/(sir0 + sir1). A property of the nested logit model is that












where s0 is the share of the outside alternative, i.e., s0 ≡ 1 −
PN
i=1(sir0 + sir1).
Travelers’ demand and airlines’ price competition in this model are static and at the local
market level. The variable proﬁt of airline i in route r is:
πir =( pir0 − cir0) qir0 +( pir1 − cir1) qir1 (8)
where ck is the marginal cost of product k, that is constant with respect to the quantity
sold. Our speciﬁcation of the marginal cost is similar to the one of product quality:
ck = δ1 NSk + δ2 HUBO
k + δ3 HUBD
k + δ4 (1 − NSk)HUBC











δ1 to δ5 are parameters. ω
(1)
i is an airline ﬁxed-eﬀect that captures between-airlines diﬀer-




r capture time-variant, airport-speciﬁcs h o c k si nc o s t s
which are common for all the airlines. ω
(4)
k is a shock in the marginal cost that is airline,
route and time speciﬁc.
Given quality indexes {αk} and marginal costs {ck}, airlines active in route r compete
in prices ala Nash-Bertrand. The Nash-Bertrand equilibrium is characterized by the system
of price equations:13
pk − ck =
σ1
1 − ¯ sk
(10)
where ¯ sk =( eir0 +eir1)σ2/σ1[1+
PN
j=1(ejr0 +ejr1)σ2/σ1]−1, ek ≡ Ik exp{(αk −pk)/σ2},a n dIk
is the indicator of the event "product k is available in route r". Equilibrium prices depend
on the qualities and marginal costs of the active airlines and products.
An airline total variable proﬁts is the some of the proﬁts {πir} over all the possible routes
that the airline serves given its network xit.
12The nested logit model implies the following relationships. Deﬁne ek ≡ Ik exp{(αk − pk)/σ2},a n dIk is
the indicator of the event "product k is available in route r". Then, sk = s∗
k ¯ sir; s∗
k = ek/(eir0 + eir1);a n d
¯ sir =( eir0 + eir1)σ2/σ1[1 +
PN
j=1(ejr0 + ejr1)σ2/σ1]−1.
13See page 251 in Anderson, De Palma and Thisse (1992).
102.3 Fixed costs and sunk entry costs
The total ﬁxed cost and entry cost of airline i at quarter t is:
Fit =
XM
m=1 aimt (FCimt + εimt +( 1− ximt) ECimt) (11)
where FCimt + εimt and ECimt represent ﬁxed operating costs and entry costs, respectively,
of operating non-stop ﬂights in city-pair m.T h eﬁxed cost FCimt + εimt is paid only if the
airline decides to operate in city-pair m, i.e., if aimt =1 .T h e e n t r y c o s t ECimt is paid
only when the airline is not active in market m at period t b u ti td e c i d e st oo p e r a t ei nt h e
market next period, i.e., if ximt =0and aimt =1 .T h e t e r m s {FC imt} and {ECimt} are
common knowledge for all the airlines. However, the component εimt is private information
of the airline. This private information shock is assumed to be independently and identically
distributed over ﬁrms and over time.
Our speciﬁcation of the common knowledge components of ﬁxed costs and entry costs is
similar to the one of marginal costs and consumers’ willingness to pay:
FCimt = γFC
1 + γFC
2 HUBimt + γFC





2 HUBimt + ηEC




γ0s and η0s are parameters. HUBimt represents the average hub-size of airline i in the airports
of city-pair m. γFC
5i and ηEC
5i are airline ﬁxed-eﬀects. γFC
6c and ηEC
6c are city ﬁxed-eﬀects.
2.4 Reducing the dimensionality of the dynamic game of network
competition
The estimation and solution of the dynamic game of network competition that we have
described in section 2.1 is extremely challenging from a computational point of view. Given
the number of cities and airlines in our empirical analysis,14 the space of possible values
of the industry network xt is really huge: i.e., |X| =2 NM ' 1010,000. We consider several
simplifying assumptions that reduce very signiﬁcantly the dimension of the dynamic game
and make its estimation and solution very manageable.
14We consider N =2 2airlines, and C =5 5cities, that implies M =1 ,485 city-pairs.
11Suppose that each airline has M local managers, one for each market or city-pair. A
local manager decides whether to operate or not non-stop ﬂights in his local-market: i.e.,
he chooses aimt.L e t Rimt be the sum of airline i’s variable proﬁts over all the routes that
include city-pair m.
ASSUMPTION NET-1: The local manager at market m chooses aimt ∈ {0,1} to maximize




where Πimt ≡ ximtRimt − aimt (FC imt + εimt +( 1− ximt)ECimt).
ASSUMPTION NET-2: The shocks {εimt} are private information of the local manager of
airline i at market m. These shocks are unknown to the managers of airline i at markets
other than m.
Assumptions NET-1 and NET-2 establish that an airline’s network decision is decentral-
ized at the city-pair level. It is important to note that this decentralized decision-making
can still generate the type of entry deterrence suggested by Hendricks, Piccione and Tan
(1997), and that we have described in the Introduction. A local manager of a city-pair takes
i n t oa c c o u n tt h a te x i tf r o mt h i sm a r k e te l i m i n a t e sp r o ﬁts from every route that includes this
city-pair as a segment. This complementarity between proﬁts of diﬀerent routes may imply
that a hub-spoke network is an eﬀective strategy to deter the entry of competitors.
To complete the model we follow a similar approach to Hendel and Nevo (2006) and
Nevo and Rossi (2008) to reduce the dimensionality of the decision problem. First, note the
following feature of the model: for local-manager (i,m), the current proﬁta ta n yp e r i o dt can
be described in terms of only three time-varying variables: the indicator of incumbent status,
ximt;t h ev a r i a b l ep r o ﬁt, Rimt; and the hub-size measure, HUBimt.15 Let x∗
imt represent the
vector (ximt,Rimt,HUBimt). We consider the following assumption.
ASSUMPTION NET-3: Consider the decision problem of local-manager (i,m).L e tP−im
be the vector with the CCPs of all airlines other than i, and all local-managers of airline i
15Variable proﬁt Rimt is well-deﬁned regardless the airline is active in market m or not. That is, Rimt
represents the potential variable proﬁt of airline i in market m. The actual variable proﬁti sximtRimt.
12other than (i,m).G i v e nP−im,t h ev e c t o rx∗
imt ≡ (ximt,Rimt, HUBimt) follows a ﬁrst-order


















Under this assumption, and for a given P−im,t h ev e c t o ro fp a y o ﬀ-relevant state vari-
ables for local-manager (i,m) is (ximt,Rimt, HUBimt).W eu s eX∗ to represent the space of
(ximt,Rimt, HUBimt).
Given these assumptions, we redeﬁne a Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) in our dy-
namic game of network competition. Let σ ≡ {σim(x∗
imt,ε imt):i =1 ,2,...,N; m =
1,2,...,M} be a set of strategy functions, one for each local-manager, such that σim is a
function from X∗ × R into {0,1}. A Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) in this game is a
set of strategy functions such that each local manager’s strategy maximizes the value of the
airline in his local market taken as given the strategies of the other airlines as well as the
strategies other local managers of the same airline. More formally, σ is a MPE if for every
local manager (i,m) and every state (x∗
imt,ε imt) we have that:
{σim(x∗
imt,ε imt)=1 } ⇔
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A MPE can be described in the space of conditional choice probabilities (CCPs). Let P =
{Pim(x∗)} be a vector of CCPs for every local manager, and every value of x∗ ∈ X∗. Then,























To complete the model we have to specify the transition probability function of the vec-






. First, it is clear that the transition






. We consider a VAR model with varying
13coeﬃcients.
log(Rim,t+1)=λR0(ximt,a imt)+λRR(ximt,a imt)l o g ( Rimt)









= λH0(ximt,a imt)+λHR(ximt,a imt)l o g ( Rimt)






Given that (ximt,a imt) can take only four values, {(0,0),(0,1),(1,0),(1,1)},e a c hλ(.) func-
tion can be represented in terms of 4 parameters. The variables uR,im,t+1 and uH,im,t+1
represent error terms which include airline ﬁxed-eﬀects, city ﬁxed-eﬀects, and pure idiosyn-
cratic innovations which are independently distributed over time.
3 Data and descriptive statistics
3.1 Construction of the working sample
We use data from the Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) collected by the Oﬃce
of Airline Information of the Bureau of Transportation Statistics. The DB1B survey is a
10% sample of airline tickets from the large certiﬁed carriers in US, and it is divided into 3
parts, namely DB1B-Coupon, DB1B-Market and DB1B-Ticket. The frequency is quarterly.
A record in this survey represents a ticket. Each record or ticket contains information on the
carrier, the origin and destination airports, miles ﬂown, the type of ticket (i.e., round-trip or
one-way), the total itinerary fare, and the number of coupons.16 T h er a wd a t as e tc o n t a i n s
millions of tickets for each quarter. For instance, the number of records in the fourth quarter
of 2004 is 8,458,753. To construct our working sample, we have used the DB1B dataset over
the year 2004. We describe here the criteria to construct our working sample, as well as
similarities and diﬀerences with related studies which have used the DB1B database.
(a) Deﬁnition of a market and a product. From the point of view of entry-exit decisions,
a market is a non-directional city-pair. For the model of demand and price competition a
market is a round-trip travel between two cities, an origin city and a destination city. These
16This dataset does no contain information on ticket restrictions such as 7 or 14 days purchase in advance.
Another information that is not available is the day or week of the ﬂight or the ﬂight number.
14market deﬁnitions are the same as in Berry (1992) and Berry, Carnall and Spiller (2006),
among others. Our deﬁnition of market is also similar to the one used by Borenstein (1989) or
Ciliberto and Tamer (2006) with the only diﬀerence that they consider airport-pairs instead
of city-pairs. The main reason why we consider city-pairs instead of airport-pairs is to allow
for substitution in the demand (and in the supply) of routes that involve airports located in
the same city. In the demand, we distinguish diﬀerent types of products within a market.
The type of product depends on whether the ﬂight is non-stop or stop, and on the origin
and destination airports. Thus, the itineraries New York (La Guardia)-Los Angeles, New
York (JFK)-Los Angeles, and New York (JFK)-Las Vegas-Los Angeles are three diﬀerent
products in the New York-Los Angeles route-market.
(b) Selection of markets. We started selecting the 75 largest US cities in terms of population
in 2004. We use city population estimates from the Population Estimates Program in the
Bureau of Statistics to ﬁnd out the 75 largest US cities in 2004.17 For each city, we use all
the airports which are classiﬁed as primary airports by the Federal Aviation Administration.
Some of the 75 cities belong to the same metropolitan area and share the same airports. We
group these cities. Finally, we have 55 cities or metropolitan areas and 63 airports. Table
1 presents the list of "cities" with their airports and population.18 To measure market size,
we use the total population in the cities of the origin and destination airports. The number
of possible city-pairs is M =( 5 5∗ 54)/2=1 ,485. Table 2 presents the top 20 city-pairs by
annual number of round-trip non-stop passengers in 2004 according to DB1B.
(c) Deﬁnition of carrier. There may be more than one airline or carrier involved in a ticket.
The DB1B distinguishes three types of carriers: operating carrier, ticketing carrier, and
reporting carrier. The operating carrier is an airline whose aircraft and ﬂight crew are used
17The Population Estimates Program produces annually population estimates based upon the last de-
cennial census and up-to-date demographic information. We use the data from the category “Cities and
towns”.
18Our selection criterion is similar to Berry (1992) who selects the 50 largest cities, and uses city-pair as
deﬁnition of market. Ciliberto and Tamer (2006) select airport-pairs within the 150 largest Metropolitan
Statistical Areas. Borenstein (1989) considers airport-pairs within the 200 largest airports.
15in air transportation. The ticketing carrier is the airline that issued the air ticket. And
the reporting carrier is the one that submits the ticket information to the Oﬃce of Airline
Information. According to the directives of the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (Number
224 of the Accounting and Reporting Directives), the ﬁrst operating carrier is responsible
for submitting the applicable survey data as reporting carrier. For more than 70% of the
tickets in this database the three variables are the same. For the construction of our working
sample, we use the reporting carrier to identify the airline and assume that this carrier pays
the cost of operating the ﬂight and receives the revenue for providing this service.
(e) Selection of tickets. We apply several selection ﬁlters on tickets in the DB1B database.
We eliminate all those tickets with some of the following characteristics: (1) one-way tickets,
and tickets which are neither one-way nor round-trip; (2) more than 6 coupons (a coupon is
equivalent to a segment or a boarding pass); (3) foreign carriers; and (4) tickets with fare
credibility question by the Department of Transportation.
(f) Airlines. According to DB1B, there are 31 airlines operating in our selected markets in
2004. However, not all these airlines can be considered as independent because some of them
belong to the same corporation or have very exclusive code-sharing agreements.19 We take
this into account in our analysis. Table 3 presents our list of 22 airlines. The notes in the
table explains how some of these "airlines" combine several carriers. The table also reports,
for each airline, the number of passengers and the number of city-pairs in which the airline
operates for our selected 55 cities. Southwest is the company that ﬂies more passengers
(more than 25 million passengers) and that serves more city-pairs with nonstop ﬂights (373
of a maximum of 1,485). American, United and Delta, in this order, follow in the ranking,
but they serve signiﬁcantly fewer city-pairs (with non-stop ﬂights) than Southwest.
(g) Deﬁnition of active carrier in a route-product. W ec o n s i d e rt h a ta na i r l i n ei sa c t i v ei n
a city-pair if during the quarter the airline has at least 20 passengers per week (260 per
19Code sharing is a practice where a ﬂight operated by an airline is jointly marketed as a ﬂight for one or
more other airlines.
16quarter) in non-stop ﬂights for that city-pair.
(h) Construction of quantity and price data. A ticket/record in the DB1B database may
correspond to more than one passenger. The DB1B-Ticket dataset reports the number of
passengers in a ticket. Our quantity measure qk is the number of passengers in the DB1B
survey at quarter t that corresponds to airline i,r o u t er and product NS.T h eD B 1 B - T i c k e t
dataset reports the total itinerary fare. We construct the price variable pk (measured in
dollars-per-passenger) as the ratio between the sum of fares for those tickets that belong to
product k and the sum of passengers in the same group of tickets.
(i) Measure of hub size. For each airport and airline, we construct a measure of the scale
of operation, or hub-size, of the airline at the airport. Following Berry (1990) and Berry,
Carnall and Spiller (2006), we measure the hub-size of an airline-airport as the sum of the
population in other markets that the airline serves with nonstop ﬂi g h t sf r o mt h i sa i r p o r t .
The reason to weight routes by the number of passengers travelling in the route is that more
popular routes are more valued by consumers and therefore this hub measure takes into
account this service to consumers.
Our working dataset is an unbalanced panel with 1,485 city-pairs, 2,970 routes, 22 airline,
and 4 quarters. The number of observations is 249,530.
3.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 4 presents, for each airline, the two airports with largest hub sizes. The largest hubs
are Delta Airlines at Atlanta (48.5 million people) and Tampa (46.9), Northwest at Detroit
(47.6) and Minneapolis-St. Paul (47.1), Continental at Washington International (46.9) and
Cleveland (45.6), American at Dallas-Fort Worth (46.7) and Chicago-O’Hare (44.4), and
United at Denver (45.9) and San Francisco (45.8). Note that Southwest, though it ﬂies more
passengers and is active in more markets than any other airline, has signiﬁcantly smaller
hubs than most other airlines.
Tables 5 presents diﬀerent statistics that describe market structure and its dynamics.
17The ﬁrst panel of the table (panel 5.1) presents the distribution of the 1,485 city-pairs by
the number of incumbent airlines. More than one-third of the city-pairs have no incumbents,
i.e., there are not non-stop ﬂights between the pair of cities. Typically, these are pairs of
relative small cities which are far away of each other (e.g., Tulsa, OK, and Ontario, CA).
Almost one-third of the markets are monopolies, and approximately 17% are duopolies. The
average number of incumbents per market is only 1.4. Therefore, these markets are highly
concentrated, as it is also illustrated by the value of the Herﬁndahl index in panel 5.2. Panel
5.3 presents the number of monopoly markets for each of the most important carriers. South-
west, with approximately 150 markets, accounts for a large portion of monopoly markets,
followed by Northwest and Delta, with less than 70 monopoly markets each. Panels 5.4 and
5.5 present the distribution of markets by the number of new entrants and by the number
of exits, respectively. It is interesting that, even for our quarterly frequency of observation,
there is a substantial amount of entry and exit in these markets. The average number of
entrants per market and quarter is 0.17 and the average number of exits is 0.12.A ss h o w n
in section 4, this signiﬁcant turnover provides information to identify ﬁx e dc o s t sa n de n t r y
costs parameters with enough precision.
Table 6 presents the transition matrix for the number of incumbent airlines in a city-pair.
We report the transition matrix from the second to the third quarter of 2004, which is very
similar to the transition matrices from Q1 to Q2 or from Q3 to Q4. There is signiﬁcant
persistence in market structure, specially in markets with zero incumbents or in monopoly
markets. Nevertheless, there is a non-negligible amount of transition dynamics.
4 Estimation of the structural model
Our approach to estimate the structural model proceeds in three steps. First, we estimate
the parameters in the demand system using information on prices, quantities and product
characteristics. In a second step, we estimate the parameters in the marginal cost function
using the Nash-Bertrand equilibrium conditions. Steps 1 and 2 provide estimates of the
18eﬀects of hub-size on demand and variable costs. Given these estimates of variable proﬁts,
we estimate the parameters in ﬁxed costs and entry costs using the dynamic game of network
competition. For this third step, we use a recursive pseudo maximum likelihood estimator
as proposed in Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007).
4.1 Estimation of the demand system
The demand model can be represented using the regression equation:















The regressors in vector Wkt are the ones in equation (6): i.e., dummy for nonstop-ﬂight,
hub-size variables, distance, airline dummies, origin-airport dummies × time dummies, and
destination-airport dummies × time dummies.
It is well-known that an important econometric issue in the estimation of this demand
system is the endogeneity of prices and conditional market shares ln(s∗
kt) (see Berry, 1994,
and Berry, Levinshon and Pakes, 1995). Equilibrium prices depend on the characteristics
(observable and unobservable) of all products, and therefore the regressor pkt is correlated
w i t ht h eu n o b s e r v a b l ed e m a n ds h o c kξ
(4)
kt . Similarly, the regressor ln(s∗
kt) depends on un-
observed characteristics and it is endogenous. In our model, there is another potential
endogeneity problem in the estimation of the demand. The hub-size variables HUBO
kt and
HUBD
kt (included in the vector Wkt) depend on the entry decisions of the airline in city-pairs
connected with the origin or the destination of the route in product k (though excluding
the city-pair of product k). These variables may be correlated with the demand shock ξ
(4)
kt .
Suppose that the local managers of city-pairs that include the origin or the destination cities
of the route in product k know the demand shock {ξ
(4)
kt } and they take it into account when
deciding whether to be active or not. If that is the case, the entry-exit decisions of these local
managers, and therefore HUBO
kt and HUBD
kt, depend on {ξ
(4)
kt }, and the hub-size variables
are endogenous in the estimation of the demand model.
19The following identifying assumption implies that the hub-size variables are not endoge-
nous in the estimation of demand.20
ASSUMPTION D1: The idiosyncratic demand shock {ξ
(4)
kt } is independently distributed over
time.
Assumption D1 establishes that once we control for the observable variables in Wkt, including
airline ﬁxed eﬀects ξ
(1)




kt , the residual demand left does
not present any persistence or time-series correlation. Given that entry-exit decisions are
taken a quarter before they become eﬀective, if demand shocks {ξ
(4)
kt } are independently
distributed over time, they are not correlated with hub-size variables.
ASSUMPTION D2: The idiosyncratic demand shock {ξ
(4)
kt } is private information of the cor-
responding airline. Furthermore, the demand shocks of two diﬀerent airlines at two diﬀerent
routes are independently distributed.
Remember that the hub-size variables HUBO
kt and HUBO
kt depend on the entry decisions in
city-pairs that include one of the cities in the origin or the destination of route in product
k, but they exclude the own city-pair of product k. Under Assumption D2, the hub-size
variables of other airlines in the same route are not correlated with ξ
(4)
kt .F u r t h e r m o r e , b y
the equilibrium condition, prices depend on the hub-size of every active ﬁrm in the market.
Therefore, we can use the hub-sizes of competing airlines as valid instruments for the price
pkt and the market share ln(s∗
kt). We use as instruments the average value of the hub-sizes of
the competitors. Note that Assumptions D1 and D2 are testable. Using the residuals from
the estimation we can test for time-series correlation (Assumption D1), and cross-airlines
correlation in the idiosyncratic demand shocks ξ
(4)
kt .
Table 7 presents our estimates of the demand system. To illustrate the endogeneity
problem, we report both OLS and IV estimation results. The estimated coeﬃcient for the
FARE variable in the IV estimation is signiﬁcantly smaller than in the OLS estimation, which
20Sweeting (2007) has also considered this type of identifying assumption in the estimation of a demand
system of radio listeners in the context of a dynamic oligopoly model of the commercial radio industry.
20is consistent with the endogeneity of prices in the OLS estimation. The test of ﬁrst order
serial correlation in the residuals cannot reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation.
This result supports Assumption D1, and therefore the exogeneity of the hub-size variables.
We can obtain measures of willingness to pay for diﬀerent product characteristics, in dollar
amounts, by dividing the coeﬃcient of the product characteristic by the coeﬃcient of the
FARE variable. We ﬁnd that the willingness to pay for a non-stop ﬂight is $152 more than
for a stop-ﬂight. The estimated eﬀects of hub-size are also plausible. Expanding the hub-size
in the origin airport (destination airport) in one million people would increase consumers
willingness to pay in $1.97 ($2.63). Finally, longer nonstop distance makes consumer more
inclined to use airplane transportation than other transportation modes.
4.2 Estimation of variable costs
Given the Nash-Bertrand price equations and our estimates of demand parameters, we can
obtain estimates of marginal costs as ˆ ckt = pkt − ˆ σ1(1 − ¯ skt)−1,w h e r eˆ σ1(1 − ¯ skt)−1 is,
according to the model, the estimated price-cost margin of product k at period t.T h e
marginal cost function can be represented using the regression equation ˆ ckt = Wkt δ + ω
(4)
kt .
The vector of regressors Wkt has the same interpretation as in the demand equation: dummy
for nonstop-ﬂight, hub-size variables, distance, airline dummies, origin-airport dummies ×
time dummies, and destination-airport dummies × time dummies.
As in the estimation of demand, the hub-size variables are potentially endogenous regres-
sors in the estimation of the marginal cost function. These variables may be correlated with
the cost shock ω
(4)
kt . We consider the following identifying assumption.
ASSUMPTION MC1: The idiosyncratic shock in marginal cost {ω
(4)
kt } is independently dis-
tributed over time.
Assumption MC1 implies that the hub-size variables are exogenous regressors in the mar-
ginal cost function. Under this assumption, the vector of parameters δ can be estimated
consistently by OLS.
21Table 8 presents OLS estimates of the marginal cost function. The marginal cost of a
non-stop ﬂight is $12 larger than the marginal cost of a stop-ﬂight, but this diﬀerence is
not statistically signiﬁcant. Distance has a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect on marginal cost.
The airline scale of operation (or hub-size) at the origin and destination airports reduce
marginal costs. However, these eﬀects are relatively small. An increase of one million people
in the hub-size of the origin airport (destination airport) would reduce the marginal cost
(per passenger) in $2.3 ($1.6).
4.3 Estimation of the dynamic game
4.3.1 An alternative representation of the equilibrium mapping
As we have described in section 2.4, a MPE of our dynamic game can be described as a vector























Following Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), we can get a simple and useful representation of













order to describe this representation, it is convenient to write the current proﬁto fal o c a l
manager, Πimt,a sf o l l o w s :
Πimt =( 1− aimt) zimt(0)
0θ + aimt zimt(1)
0θ − aimt εimt (19)


















4i } and {ηEC
4i } represent airline ﬁxed-eﬀects in ﬁxed costs and entry costs, respec-
tively, and {γFC
5c } and {γEC
5c } represent city ﬁxed-eﬀects. zimt(0) and zimt(1) are column
22vectors with the following deﬁnitions:




ximtRimt, 1, HUBimt,D I S T m,A I R D U M i,C I T Y D U M m
(1 − ximt), (1 − ximt)HUBimt, (1 − ximt)DISTm,
(1 − ximt)AIRDUMi, (1 − ximt)CITYDUMm )
0
(21)
AIRDUMi and CITYDUMm are vectors of airline dummies and city dummies, respec-
tively.21
Given this vector notation, we can represent a MPE in this model as a vector P =
















where we have assumed that εimt is a random variable with logistic distribution and variance
σ2
























































The expression of ˜ eP
imt is based on the assumption that εimt is a logistic random variable.
Though these expressions of ˜ zP
imt and ˜ eP
imt involve inﬁnite sums, these values can be calculated
solving a system of linear equations with the same dimension as the space of the vector of
state variables x∗
imt (see Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2007, for further details).
For the computation of the values˜ zP
imt and ˜ eP
imt we discretize the variables (Rimt,HUBimt).
Figures 1 and 2 present the empirical distributions of the variables ln(Rimt) and HUBimt.
We discretize ln(Rimt) using a uniform grid of 31 points in the interval [4,18]. Similarly,
we discretize HUBimt using a uniform grid of 26 points in the interval [0,50]. These dis-
cretizations imply that the state space of (ximt,R imt,HUBimt)h a s31∗26 ∗2=1 ,612 cells.
21AIRDUMi is a vector of dimension N =2 2with a 1 at the position of airline i and zeroes elsewhere.
Similarly, CITYDUMm is a vector of dimension C =5 5with 10s at the positions of the two cities in market
m and zeroes elsewhere.
23This determines the order of the system of linear equations that we have to solve to obtain
˜ zP
imt and ˜ eP
imt.N o t et h a tw eh a v et os o l v et h i ss y s t e mf o re v e r yl o c a lm a n a g e r(i,m).T h e r e
are 22 ∗ 1,485 = 32,670 local managers. Therefore, we have to solve 32,670 systems of
linear equations with dimension 1,612 each. This is the main computational burden in the
estimation of this model.
4.3.2 Estimators






















For given P, this is the log-likelihood function of a standard logit model where the parameter
of one of the explanatory variables (i.e., the parameter associated to ˜ eP
imt) is restricted to be
one.
Let θ0 b et h et r u ev a l u eo ft h eθ in the population, and let P0 b et h et r u ee q u i l i b r i u m
in the population. The vector P0 is an equilibrium associated with θ0: i.e., in vector form,
P0 = Λ
¡
˜ zP0’θ +˜ eP0¢
. A two-step estimator of θ is deﬁned as a pair (ˆ θ, ˆ P) such that ˆ P is
a nonparametric consistent estimator of P0 and ˆ θ maximizes the pseudo likelihood Q(θ, ˆ P).
The main advantage of this estimator is its simplicity. Given ˆ P and the constructed variables
˜ z
ˆ P
imt and ˜ e
ˆ P
imt, the vector of parameters θ0 is estimated using a standard logit model. However,
this two-step method suﬀers of several important limitations. First, the method should be
initialized with a consistent estimator of P0. That consistent estimator may not be available
in models with unobserved heterogeneity. Our model includes airline and city heterogeneity
in ﬁxed costs and entry costs. Conditional on (i,m) we have only T =4observations, and
therefore it is not plausible to argue that we have a consistent nonparametric estimator of P0.
However, note that given a consistent estimator of P0, the logit estimator of θ0 in the second
step is consistent despite the existence of unobserved airline and city heterogeneity. This logit
estimator captures this heterogeneity by including airline dummies (22)a n dc i t yd u m m i e s
24(55), but not city-pair dummies (i.e., we would have to include 1,485 dummies). Without
a parametric assumption that establishes how the city dummies enter into the model, we
have that including city dummies is equivalent to include city-pair dummies. Therefore, the
nonparametric estimator is not consistent. A second important of the two-step method is
that, even if consistent, the initial estimator ˆ P typically suﬀers of the well-known curse of
dimensionality in nonparametric estimation. When the number of conditioning variables is
relatively large, the estimator ˆ P can be very seriously biased and imprecise in small samples.
In a nonlinear model, both the bias and the variance of ˆ P can generate serious biases in the
second step estimator of θ0.
Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) proposed an alternative estimator that deals with the
limitations of the two-step method. The Nested Pseudo Likelihood (NPL) estimator is
deﬁned as a pair (ˆ θ, ˆ P) that satisﬁes the following two conditions:
ˆ θ =a r g m a x
θ∈Θ
Q(θ, ˆ P)
ˆ P = Λ
³
˜ z
ˆ P’ˆ θ +˜ e
ˆ P
´ (25)
That is, ˆ θ maximizes the pseudo likelihood given ˆ P (as in the two-step estimator), and ˆ P is
an equilibrium associated with ˆ θ. This estimator has lower asymptotic variance and ﬁnite
sample bias than the two step estimator (see Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2007, and Kasahara
and Shimotsu, 2008).
A recursive extension of the two-step method can be used as a simple algorithm to obtain
the NPL estimator. We initialize the procedure with an initial vector of CCPs, say ˆ P0.N o t e
that ˆ P0 is not necessarily a consistent estimator of P0. Then, at iteration K ≥ 1,w e
update our estimates of (θ0,P0) by using the pseudo maximum likelihood (logit) estimator
ˆ θ
K
























Upon convergence this algorithm provides the NPL estimator. Maximization of the pseudo
25likelihood function with respect to θ is extremely simple because Q(θ,P) is globally concave
in θ for any possible value of P.
In our application, we initialize the procedure with a reduced-form estimation of the CCPs
Pim(x∗
imt) based on a logit model that includes as explanatory variables airline dummies,
city dummies, and a second order polynomial in (Rimt,HUBimt) where the terms of this
polynomial are interacted with the incumbent status dummy ximt.
4.3.3 Estimation results
Table 9 presents our estimation results for the dynamic game of network competition. The
estimates are measured in thousands of dollars. The estimated ﬁxed cost, evaluated at the
mean value of hub-size and distance, is $117,000. Since the median variable proﬁti nt h e
sample is around $159,000, we have that this ﬁxed cost is 73% of the median variable proﬁt.
Not surprisingly for this industry, this value implies substantial economies of scale. Fixed
costs increase with the distance between the two cities: it increases $4.64 per mile. Hub-size
has also a signiﬁcant eﬀect on ﬁxed costs. A million people increase of hub-size implies a
$1,610 reduction in ﬁxed costs. This is a non-negligible cost reduction.
The estimated entry cost, evaluated at the mean value of hub-size and distance, is
$242,000. This value represents 207% of the corresponding (quarterly) ﬁxed cost, 152%
of the median variable proﬁt, and 5.8 times the (quarterly) operating proﬁt( v a r i a b l ep r o ﬁt
minus ﬁxed cost) in a market with median variable proﬁt, mean distance and mean hub-size.
That is, it requires almost six quarters of proﬁts to compensate the ﬁrm for its initial invest-
ment or entry cost. These costs do not depend signiﬁcantly on ﬂown distance. However, the
eﬀect of hub-size is very important. While an airline with the minimum hub-size (i.e., zero)
has to pay an entry cost of $501,000, and airline with the maximum hub-size in the sample
(i.e., 50 million people) pays only $12,000. A one million people increase in hub-size implies
a reduction of entry costs of more than $10,000.
265 Disentangling demand, cost and strategic factors
We use our estimated model to measure the contribution of demand, cost and strategic
factors to explain airlines’ propensity to operate using hub-and-spoke networks. We consider
a simple measure of this propensity, that we deﬁne as an airline’s hub − ratio. Airlines’
hub ratios can be obtained from the data. Then, we analyze how diﬀerent parameters
of the model contribute to the observed hub-ratios. The parameters of interest are the
ones that measure the eﬀects hub-size on demand, variable costs, ﬁx e dc o s t sa n de n t r y
costs. We use the estimated model to calculate the counterfactual hub-ratio if some of these
parameters becomes zero. We distinguish two diﬀerent types of counterfactual experiments:
an experiment where the behavior of the other airlines remains the same; and an experiment
where the other airlines change their behavior in the new equilibrium. The comparison
between the two types of experiments provides a measure of the importance of strategic
factors in the adoption of hub-and-spoke networks.
5.1 Empirical hub-ratios
To obtain our measure of an airline propensity to operate using a hub-and-spoke network,
we start assuming that each airline has two hub airports. These hub airports are the two
airports with the largest values of hub-size for the airline. For the most important carriers,
this ’empirical’ deﬁnition of a hub-airport coincides with the self-reported hubs. Table 4
presents the list of hub-airports using our deﬁnition of hubs. Then, an airline hub-ratio is
deﬁned as:
hub − ratioit =
PM




Of those city-pairs in which the airline is active (with nonstop ﬂights), the hub-ratio is the
proportion of these city-pairs that involve a hub airport.
Table 10 presents the hub ratios of the top 12 airlines. Southwest hub-ratio (15.6%) is
substantially smaller than those of any other airline in the industry. Within the other large
27carriers, Continental (with 61.3%), Northwest (49.2), and American (40.1) are the ones with
largest hub ratios. Interestingly, we ﬁnd very large hub ratios among some of regional carriers
such as Alaska (90.6%), ATA (66.7), Frontier (62.5%), and America West (60.2%).
5.2 A simple method to deal with multiple equilibria in counter-
factual experiments
Multiplicity of equilibria is an important problem when we use the estimated model to predict
players’ behavior in counterfactual scenarios such as a change in structural parameters. Here
we propose an approach to deal with this problem. The main advantage of this approach is its
simplicity, and that it makes minimum assumptions on the equilibrium selection mechanism.
Its main limitation is that it provides only a ﬁrst order approximation. This approximation
might be imprecise when the counterfactual structural parameters are far from the estimated
values.
An equilibrium associated with θ is a vector of choice probabilities P that solves the
ﬁxed point problem P = Λ
¡
˜ zP’θ +˜ eP¢
. For a given value θ, the model can have multiple
equilibria. The model can be completed with an equilibrium selection mechanism. This
mechanism can be represented as a function that, for given θ, selects one equilibrium within
the set of equilibria associated with θ.W e u s e π(θ) to represent this (unique) selected
equilibrium. Our approach here (both for the estimation and for counterfactual experiments)
is agnostic with respect to the equilibrium selection mechanism. We assume that there is
such a mechanism, and that it is a smooth function of θ. But we do not specify any particular
form for the equilibrium selection mechanism π(.).
Let θ0 be the true value of θ in the population under study. Suppose that the data
(and the population) come from a unique equilibrium associated with θ0.L e t P0 be the
equilibrium in the population. By deﬁnition, P0 is such that P0 = Λ
¡
˜ zP0’θ0 +˜ eP0¢
and
P0 = π(θ0).L e t(ˆ θ0, ˆ P0) be a consistent estimator of (θ0,P0).N o t et h a tw ed on o tk n o w
the function π(θ). All what we know is that the point (ˆ θ0, ˆ P0) belongs to the graph of this
function π.L e t θ
∗ be the vector of parameters under a counterfactual scenario. We want
28to obtain airlines’ behavior and equilibrium outcomes under θ
∗.T h a ti s ,w ew a n tt ok n o w
the counterfactual equilibrium π(θ
∗). The key issue to implement this experiment is that
given θ
∗ the model has multiple equilibria, and we do not know the function π.G i v e no u r
model assumptions, the mapping Λ
¡
˜ zP’θ +˜ eP¢
is continuously diﬀerentiable in (θ,P).O u r
approach requires also the following assumption.
ASSUMPTION PRED: The equilibrium selection mechanism π(θ) is a continuously diﬀer-
entiable function of θ around ˆ θ0.
Under this assumption we can use a ﬁrst order Taylor expansion to obtain an approxima-
tion to the counterfactual choice probabilities π(θ
∗) around our estimator ˆ θ0.A ni n t u i t i v e
interpretation of our approach is that we select the counterfactual equilibrium which is
"closer" (in a Taylor-approximation sense) to the equilibrium estimated in t0he data. The
data is not only useful to identify the equilibrium in the population but also to identify the
equilibrium in the counterfactual experiments. A Taylor approximation to π(θ

















Note that π(ˆ θ0)=ˆ P0 and that π(ˆ θ0)=Λ(˜ zπ(ˆ θ0)’ˆ θ0 +˜ eπ(ˆ θ0)).D i ﬀerentiating this last
















And solving for ∂π(ˆ θ0)/∂θ
0 we can represent this Jacobian matrix in terms of Jacobians of
Λ
¡
˜ zP’θ +˜ eP¢









































29Therefore, under the condition that
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known to the researcher.
5.3 Results
Table 11 presents the results of our counterfactual experiments. Hub-size eﬀects on variable
proﬁts and ﬁxed costs explain only a small portion of the observed hub-ratios. However,
hub-size eﬀects on entry costs explain a very signiﬁcant portion. Furthermore, for Northwest
and Delta, strategic factors play an important role in explaining the hub-ratio. Interestingly,
after Southwest, these are the airlines that operate in a larger number of monopoly markets
(see panel 5.3 in Table 5).
6C o n c l u s i o n s
We have proposed and estimated a dynamic game of network competition in the US airline
industry. An attractive feature of the model is that an equilibrium of the model is relatively
simple to compute, and therefore the estimated model can be used to analyze the eﬀects of
alternative policies. As it is common in dynamic games, the model has multiple equilibria
and this is an important issue when using the model to make predictions. We have proposed
and implemented a simple approach to deal with multiplicity of equilibria when using this
type of model to predict the eﬀects of counterfactual experiments.
We use this model and methods to study the contribution of demand, costs, and strategic
factors to the adoption of hub-and-spoke networks by companies in the US airline industry.
Though the scale of operation of an airline in an airport has statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects
on variable proﬁts and ﬁxed operating costs, these eﬀects seem to play a minor role to
explain airlines’ propensity to adopt hub-and-spoke networks. In contrast, our estimates of
the eﬀects of hub-size on entry costs are very substantial. While airlines without previous
30presence in an airport have to pay very signiﬁcant entry costs to start their operation (i.e.,
around half a million dollars, according to our estimates), an airline with a large hub in the
airport has to pay a negligible entry cost to operate an additional route. Eliminating these
hub-size eﬀects on entry costs reduces very importantly airlines propensity to adopt hub-and-
spoke networks. In our model, these cost savings can be interpreted as due to technological
factors or to contractual agreements between airports and airlines. Investigating the speciﬁc
sources of these cost savings is an important topic for further research. For some of the larger
carriers, we also ﬁnd evidence consistent with the hypothesis that hub-and-spoke networks
are used to deter the entry of competitors in spoke markets.
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35Table 1. Cities, Airports and Population
City, State Airports City Pop. City, State Airports City Pop.
New York-Newark-Jersey LGA, JFK, EWR 8,623,609 Las Vegas, NV LAS 534,847
Los Angeles, CA LAX, BUR 3,845,541 Portland, OR PDX 533,492
Chicago, IL ORD, MDW 2,862,244 Oklahoma City, OK OKC 528,042
Dallas, TX(1) DAL, DFW 2,418,608 Tucson, AZ TUS 512,023
Phoenix-Tempe-Mesa, AZ PHX 2,091,086 Albuquerque, NM ABQ 484,246
Houston, TX HOU, IAH, EFD 2,012,626 Long Beach, CA LGB 475,782
Philadelphia, PA PHL 1,470,151 New Orleans, LA MSY 462,269
San Diego, CA SAN 1,263,756 Cleveland, OH CLE 458,684
San Antonio,TX SAT 1,236,249 Sacramento, CA SMF 454,330
San Jose, CA SJC 904,522 Kansas City, MO MCI 444,387
Detroit, MI DTW 900,198 Atlanta, GA ATL 419,122
Denver-Aurora, CO DEN 848,678 Omaha, NE OMA 409,416
Indianapolis, IN IND 784,242 Oakland, CA OAK 397,976
Jacksonville, FL JAX 777,704 Tulsa, OK TUL 383,764
San Francisco, CA SFO 744,230 Miami, FL MIA 379,724
Columbus, OH CMH 730,008 Colorado Spr, CO COS 369,363
Austin, TX AUS 681,804 Wichita, KS ICT 353,823
Memphis, TN MEM 671,929 St Louis, MO STL 343,279
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN MSP 650,906 Santa Ana, CA SNA 342,715
Baltimore, MD BWI 636,251 Raleigh-Durham, NC RDU 326,653
Charlotte, NC CLT 594,359 Pittsburg, PA PIT 322,450
El Paso, TX ELP 592,099 Tampa, FL TPA 321,772
Milwaukee, WI MKE 583,624 Cincinnati, OH CVG 314,154
Seattle, WA SEA 571,480 Ontario, CA ONT 288,384
Boston, MA BOS 569,165 Buﬀalo, NY BUF 282,864
Louisville, KY SDF 556,332 Lexington, KY LEX 266,358
Washington, DC DCA, IAD 553,523 Norfolk, VA ORF 236,587
Nashville, TN BNA 546,719
Note (1): Dallas-Arlington-Fort Worth-Plano, TX
36Table 2. Ranking of City-Pairs by
Number of Passengers (Round-trip, Non-Stop) in 2004
CITY A CITY B Total
1. Chicago New York 1,412,670
2. Los Angeles New York 1,124,690
3. Atlanta New York 1,100,530
4. Los Angeles Oakland 1,080,100
5. Las Vegas Los Angeles 1,030,170
6. Chicago Las Vegas 909,270
7. Las Vegas New York 806,230
8. Chicago Los Angeles 786,300
9. Dallas Houston 779,330
10. New York San Francisco 729,680
11. Boston New York 720,460
12. New York Tampa 713,380
13. Chicago Phoenix 706,950
14. New York Washington 680,580
15. Los Angeles Phoenix 648,510
16. Miami New York 637,850
17. Los Angeles Sacramento 575,520
18. Atlanta Chicago 570,500
19. Los Angeles San Jose 556,850




Airline (Code) #P a s s e n g e r s (1) # City-Pairs in 2004-Q4(2)
(in thousands) (maximum = 1,485)
1. Southwest (WN) 25,026 373
2. American (AA)(3) 20,064 233
3. United (UA)(4) 15,851 199
4. Delta (DL)(5) 14,402 198
5. Continental (CO)(6) 10,084 142
6. Northwest (NW)(7) 9,517 183
7. US Airways (US) 7,515 150
8. America West (HP)(8) 6,745 113
9. Alaska (AS) 3,886 32
10. ATA (TZ) 2,608 33
11. JetBlue (B6) 2,458 22
12. Frontier (F9) 2,220 48
13. AirTran (FL) 2,090 35
14. Mesa (YV)(9) 1,554 88
15. Midwest (YX) 1,081 33
16. Trans States (AX) 541 29
17. Reno Air (QX) 528 15
18. Spirit (NK) 498 9
19. Sun Country (SY) 366 11
20. PSA (16) 84 27
21. Ryan International (RD) 78 2
22. Allegiant (G4) 67 3
Note (1): Annual number of passengers in 2004 for our selected markets
Note (2): An airline is active in a city-pair if it has at least 20 passengers/week
in non-stop ﬂights.
Note (3): American (AA) + American Eagle (MQ) + Executive (OW)
Note (4): United (UA) + Air Wisconsin (ZW)
Note (5): Delta (DL) + Comair (OH) +Atlantic Southwest (EV)
Note (6): Continental (CO) + Expressjet (RU)
Note (7): Northwest (NW) + Mesaba (XJ)
Note (8): On 2005, America West merged with US Airways.
Note (9): Mesa (YV) + Freedom (F8)
38Table 4
Airlines and their Hubs (2004-Q4)
Airline (Code) Largest Hub Second largest Hub
(Hub-Size)(1) (Hub-Size)(1)
1. Southwest (WN) MCI (31.5) BWI (30.5)
2. American (AA) DFW (46.7) ORD (44.4)|
3. United (UA) DEN (45.9) SFO (45.8)
4. Delta (DL) ATL (48.5) TPA (46.8)
5. Continental (CO) IAH (46.9) CLE (45.6)
6. Northwest (NW) DTW (47.6) MSP (47.1)
7. US Airways (US) CLT (39.2) BOS (38.6)
8. America West (HP) PHX (39.6) LAS (36.1)
9. Alaska (AS) SEA (29.0) PDX (26.0)
10. ATA (TZ) IND (26.2) MDW (25.0)
11. JetBlue (B6) LGB (10.7) OAK (10.2)
12. Frontier (F9) DEN (35.1) PDX (14.2)
13. AirTran (FL) ATL (30.7) MEM (25.4)
14. Mesa (YV) AUS (23.1) BNA (22.2)
15. Midwest (YX) MKE (29.9) MCI (14.6)
16. Trans States (AX) STL (25.4) PIT (12.6)
17. Reno Air (QX) PDX (25.9) OMA (10.7)
18. Spirit (NK) DTW (13.9) LAX (12.4)
19. Sun Country (SY) MSP (21.6) JFK (0.6)
20. PSA (16) ATL (10.0) IND (8.9)
21. Ryan International (RD) ATL (4.4) LAX (0.4)
22. Allegiant (G4) LAS (0.7) OKC (0.5)
(1) Hub-size is measured in millions of people.
39Table 5
Descriptive Statistics of Market Structure
1,485 city-pairs (markets). Period 2004-Q1 to 2004-Q4
2004-Q1 2004-Q2 2004-Q3 2004-Q4 All Quarters
(5.1) Distribution of Markets by Number of Incumbents
Markets with 0 airlines 35.79% 35.12% 35.72% 35.12% 35.44%
Markets with 1 airline 30.11% 29.09% 28.76% 28.28% 29.06%
Markets with 2 airlines 17.46% 16.71% 17.52% 18.06% 17.44%
Markets with 3 airlines 9.20% 10.83% 9.47% 9.88% 9.84%
Markets with 4 or more airlines 7.43% 8.25% 8.53% 8.67% 8.22%
(5.2) Herﬁndahl Index
Herﬁndahl Index (median) 5344 5386 5286 5317 5338
(5.3) Number of Monopoly Markets by Airline
Southwest 146 153 149 157
Northwest 65 63 67 69
Delta 58 57 57 56
American 31 34 33 28
Continental 31 26 28 24
United 21 14 13 17
(5.4) Distribution of Markets by Number of New Entrants
Markets with 0 Entrants - 82.61% 86.60% 84.78% 84.66%
Markets with 1 Entrant - 14.48% 12.31% 13.33% 13.37%
Markets with 2 Entrants - 2.44% 0.95% 1.69% 1.69%
Markets with 3 Entrants - 0.47% 0.14% 0.20% 0.27%
(5.5) Distribution of Markets by Number of Exits
Markets with 0 Exits - 87.89% 85.12% 86.54% 86.51%
Markets with 1 Exit - 10.55% 13.13% 11.77% 11.82%
Markets with 2 Exits - 1.35% 1.56% 1.15% 1.35%
Markets with more 3 or 4 Exits - 0.21% 0.21% 0.54% 0.32%
40Table 6
Transition Probability of Market Structure (Quarter 2 to 3)
#F i r m si nQ 3
# Firms in Q2 01234 >4 Total
0 93.83% 5.78% 0.39% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00%
519
1 9.07% 79.53% 11.16% 0.23% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00%
430
2 0.81% 19.84% 68.42% 10.12% 0.81% 0.00% 100.00%
247
3 0.20% 3.76% 20.20% 52.28% 19.21% 4.36% 100.00%
160
4 0.00% 1.59% 6.35% 31.75% 46.03% 14.29% 100.00%
63
>4 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 5.08% 33.90% 61.02% 100.00%
59
Total 528 425 259 140 73 53 1,478
41Table 7
Demand Estimation(1)













0.488 (0.093) 0.634 (0.115)
NON-STOP DUMMY 1.217 (0.058) 2.080 (0.084)
HUBSIZE-ORIGIN (in million people) 0.032 (0.005) 0.027 (0.006)
HUBSIZE-DESTINATION (in million people) 0.041 (0.005) 0.036 (0.006)
DISTANCE 0.098 (0.011) 0.228 (0.017)
σ1 (in $100) 3.039 (0.785) 0.732 (0.059)
σ2 (in $100) 1.557 (0.460) 0.268 (0.034)
Test of Residuals Serial Correlation
m1∼ N(0,1) (p-value) 0.303 (0.762) 0.510 (0.610)
(1) All the estimations include airline dummies, origin-airport dummies × time dummies,
and destination-airport dummies × time dummies. Stadard errors in parentheses.
42Table 8
Marginal Cost Estimation(1)
Data: 85,497 observations. 2004-Q1 to 2004-Q4
Dep. Variable: Marginal Cost in $100
Estimate (Std. Error)
NON-STOP DUMMY 0.006 (0.010)
HUBSIZE-ORIGIN (in million people) -0.023 (0.009)
HUBSIZE-DESTINATION (in million people) -0.016 (0.009)
DISTANCE 5.355 (0.015)
Test of Residuals Serial Correlation
m1∼ N(0,1) (p-value) 0.761 (0.446)
(1) All the estimations include airline dummies, origin-airport dummies × time dummies,
and destination-airport dummies × time dummies.
43Table 9
Estimation of Dynamic Game of Entry-Exit(1)
Data: 1,485 markets × 22 airlines × 3q u a r t e r s= 98,010 observations
Estimate (Std. Error)




2 mean hub-size +γFC
3 mean distance 116.98 (5.931)
(average ﬁxed cost)
γFC
2 (hub-size, in million people) -1.61 (0.404)
γFC




2 mean hub-size +ηFC
2 mean distance 241.87 (6.047)
(average entry cost)
ηFC
2 (hub-size, in million people) -10.06 (0.108)
ηFC
3 (distance, in thousand miles) 0.07 (0.417)
σε 8.402 (1.385)
Pseudo R-square 0.289
(1) All the estimations include airline dummies, and city dummies.
(2) Mean hub size = 25.7 million people. Mean distance (nonstop ﬂights) = 1996 miles
44Table 10
Hub Ratios of Top 12 Airlines (2004-Q4)
Airline (Code) Hub Cities Hub-Ratio
(%)
1. Southwest (WN) Kansas City; Baltimore 15.55
2. American (AA) Detroit; Chicago 42.06
3. United (UA) Denver; San Francisco 30.65
4. Delta (DL) Atlanta; Tampa 32.32
5. Continental (CO) Houston; Cleveland 61.27
6. Northwest (NW) Detroit; Minneapolis 49.18
7. US Airways (US) Charlotte; Boston 32.67
8. America West (HP) Phoenix; Las Vegas 60.18
9. Alaska (AS) Seattle; Portland 90.63
10. ATA (TZ) Indianapolis; Chicago 66.67
11. JetBlue (B6) Long Beach; Oakland 36.36
12. Frontier (F9) Denver; Portland 62.50
45Table 11
Counterfactual Experiments
Hub-Ratios when Some Structural Parameters Become Zero
No hub-size eﬀects No hub-size eﬀects No hub-size eﬀects
in variable proﬁts in ﬁxed costs in entry costs
Carrier Observed No Strat. Strategic No Strat. Strategic No Strat. Strategic
Southwest 15.6 14.9 14.8 14.1 13.5 9.7 7.6
American 42.1 40.8 39.2 38.8 36.8 24.2 17.6
United 30.7 29.7 28.5 27.0 26.4 18.8 12.1
Delta 32.3 30.1 29.5 29.4 23.2 19.9 12.6
Continental 61.3 59.4 56.1 55.4 52.4 34.8 24.6
Northwest 49.2 47.4 44.4 44.5 37.1 29.3 15.1
America West 60.2 58.9 55.9 54.1 52.5 34.4 24.1
Alaska 90.6 87.0 84.8 81.5 78.5 50.2 36.8
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